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In a quantity-competed duopoly, one ﬁrm is a naive price-taker (who responses only to the last period’s
price) while the other has all the market information so as be able to optimize its proﬁt stream (either discounted
or un-discounted) dynamically over a ﬁnite or inﬁnite horizon. With a traditional linear economy, we are
able to derive algebraically the optimal policies of all periods for the dynamic optimizer. A counter-intuitive
phenomenon is then observed: regardless of the planning horizon and the discounted factor, there exists a relative
proﬁtability range of initial prices, starting with which the price-taker make higher proﬁt than the dynamic
optimizer. Furthermore, with the increase in the planning horizon, the price-taker’s relative proﬁtability range
increases accordingly and ﬁnally covers the entire economically meaningful range.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the classic work by Cournot in 1838, research interests in oligopoly were almost entirely concentrated
on analyzing competitions between ﬁrms which were proﬁt-maximizers. Given limited information about the
marketas wellas its rivals’behavior,whichvariedfromcase tocase, eachﬁrmis invariablyassumedto maximize
myopically its instantaneous absolute payoff with a best response (as a reaction function of its rival’s expected
output for the period). It is economically irrational if a ﬁrm either ignores or is ignorant about its market power
but behaves as a price-taker who determines its output by equating the marginal cost to the price of last period.
However, such beliefs were questioned in Huang (2002) where an oligopoly that consists of a price-taker and
many sophisticated ﬁrms, with identical technology, was studied. A counter-intuitive phenomena is revealed –
no matter what strategies the sophisticated ﬁrms may adopt, the price-taker always triumphs over them in terms
of relative proﬁtability at any dynamic equilibrium. It is further demonstrated in Huang (2008) that, either in
dynamical transitionary periods or when the economy turns cyclic or chaotic, a combination of the price-taking
1strategy with a simple cautious adjustment strategy could also lead to relatively higher average proﬁts for a ﬁrm
than its rival, should the latter adopt a myopic Cournot best-response.
The above results naturally motivate us to further investigate whether such peculiar phenomenon will be
again observedif the sophisticated ﬁrm, instead of being myopic,optimizes its discounted payoffstream over the
entire planninghorizonT (either ﬁnite or inﬁnite). To accomplish this goal, a multi-perioddynamicoptimization
problem in the context of a heterogeneous duopoly model which comprises of a sophisticated ﬁrm and a price-
taker is studied. The dynamic programming approach and reasoning framework adopted in the early studies of
duopoly game such as Friedman (1968), Cyert and DeGroot (1970) and Diricky (1973) are revisited. With a
traditional linear economy (linear demand and marginal cost), we are able to derive algebraically the optimal
policies for all periods. It is found that, regardless of the planning horizon and the discounted factor, there exists
a relative proﬁtability range of initial prices, starting with which the price-taking ﬁrm makes higher proﬁt than
the sophisticated ﬁrm. This relative proﬁtability range expands with increasing planning horizon. When the
planning horizon is sufﬁciently long, the relative proﬁtability range covers the entire economically meaningful
price regime, that is, the price-taker always enjoys a higher average proﬁt relative to the sophisticated ﬁrm for
any economically meaningful initial price level.
The remaining discussion is organized as follows. In Section 2, T-periods dynamic optimization model in-
volving the heterogeneous duopoly is formulated and the complete set of analytical recursive formulas for the
optimal plan and optimal payoffs are then derived. Section 3 explores the long-run stationary property of the
optimal plan, the turnpike property of optimal plan and address its link to the conventional static optimization
problem. Section 4 then analyzes the relative proﬁtability of the price-taking strategy. Finally, Section 5 com-
prises of the conclusion of the research as well as remarks on the future research directions.
2. DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
Consider a duopoly industry in which two ﬁrms X and Y produce a homogeneous product at period t with
quantity Xt and Yt, respectively. The inverse market demand for the product is given by Pt = D(Qd
t), with
D′ ≤ 0. The conventional assumption that Qd
t = Xt + Yt applies, i.e., the actual market price adjusts to the
demand so as to clear the market at every period.
Both ﬁrms are assumed to have an identical technology and hence an identical cost function C(q).
Firm X is assumed to be a price-taker, whose current production Xt is determined by equating the marginal
cost incurred with the naive price expectation at period t as P e
t = Pt−1, that is,
Xt = MC
−1 (Pt−1) = MC
−1 (D(Xt−1 + Yt−1)), (1)
where MC−1 denotes the inverse function of the marginal cost C′.
Firm Y, in contrast, is a dynamic optimizer whose objective is to maximize its discounted proﬁt over an
horizonof T periods with a given an initial price P0, or, equivalently,the price-taker’soutput X1 = MC−1 (P0).
Let Πy (Xt,Yt) = D(Xt + Yt)Yt −C (Yt) be the instantaneous proﬁt of the dynamic optimizer at period t.






where 0 < ρ ≤ 1 is the discount factor applied by the dynamic optimizer1.
1r = (1 − ρ)/ρ is the discount rate (Friedman 1968).
2However, for the convenience of mathematical manipulation, we shall insert the subscript k as an indication
of the periods remained before the end of planning horizon2.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ T, let the outputs of the two ﬁrms at the stage (T − k + 1) be xk ˙ =XT−k+1 and yk = YT−k+1,
respectively. Since under an optimal plan, yk is a function of xk, we are able to represent the proﬁts of the two
ﬁrms as functions of xk only, that is, πx (xk) ˙ =Πx (XT−k+1,YT−k+1) and πy (xk) ˙ =Πy (XT−k+1,YT−k+1).
Deﬁne s
y
k (xk) as the weighted sum of the maximized proﬁt for the dynamic optimizer that could possibly be


















k (xk) = max
yk
{π
y (xk) + ρs
y
k−1 (xk−1)} (3)
with the boundary condition s
y
0 ( ) ≡ 0.
The state transition equation Xt = MC−1 (D(Pt−1)) is then recast as
xk−1 = MC−1 (D(xk + yk)) (4)
while the maximized objective function (2) is thus given by Sy = s
y
T (xT) = s
y
T (X1).
Working with (xk,yk) instead of (Xt,Yt) provides us with an unique advantage of deriving a full set of
optimal policies for various planning horizon k for k ≥ 1.
The general formulations (3) and (4) also provide us with a framework to discuss the qualitative properties
of optimal solutions as well as the optimized objective function. However, the best way to explore the relative
proﬁtability quantitatively, that is, to compare the (average of) the accumulated proﬁts earned by both ﬁrms, is
to work with a model that leads to the solutions with analytically closed forms. For such consideration, we shall
proceed our discussion for the widely studied Linear Model, by which we mean: i) the market demand is linear,
that is, Pt = D(Xt+Yt) = 1−Xt−Yt and ii) the marginalcost is linear so that the cost functionadoptsthe form
of C(q) = cq2/2, where c > 1 is the cost parameter3. However, although adopting Linear Model brings about
the possibility of deriving analytically closed solutions, it also generates extra difﬁculty, that is, the possibility of
“market crash” resulting from the nonpositive price and/or over production (i.e., the industrial outputs exceeds
unity). To have a general picture of the dynamic interaction between the price-taker and the dynamic optimizer
while keeping the generality of the Linear Model, we shall focus mainly on the situations in which the optimal
plans that compose with the interior solution at each and every period so that xi ∈ (0,1), yi ∈ (0,1 − xi) and
2To avoid confusion, a usage convention will be adopted in this paper so that all capital symbols together with subscript
t indicate the forward sequences while the corresponding little cases together with subscript k ˙ =T − t + 1 indicate all the
backward sequences.
3This is because, if c < 1, the price-taker’s response to the market price xk−1 = MC−1 (D (xk + yk)) =
(1 − xk − yk)/c may be invalid (that is, may not stay in the interior of [0,1]).
3pi ∈ (0,1), for all i = 1,2...,k, can be guaranteed. For interior optimal solution, Eqs. (3) and (4) simplify to4.
s
y
k (xk) = max
0<yk<1−xk






xk−1 = (1 − (xk + yk))/c. (6)
Fortunately,for a k-periods planning, the interior optimal solutions exist for all c > 1 regardless of ρ, so long
as the initial state xk is restrained by an initial upper bound Xu
k ∈ [0,1].
Theorem 1 (Optimal policy and payoﬀs). For the Linear model with c > 1, we have
i) For any 0 < xk < Xu
k, an optimal policy is a linear function of xk given by
yk = uk − vkxk, (7)






αk (1 − xk)
2 + 2βkxk + γk
 
/2, (8)
where αk, βk and γk are constant payoﬀ coeﬃcients that can be determined recursively through
αk =
c(c + ραk−1)
c2 (2 + c) − ραk−1
, (9)
βk =
ρc(c + 1)(αk−1 − βk−1)
c2 (2 + c) − ραk−1
, (10)
γk = ρ(γk−1 +




αk−1 + 2cβk−1 (c + 1)
c2 (c + 2) − ραk−1
), (11)
with the boundary conditions α0 = β0 = γ0 = 0.
ii) Policy coeﬃcients uk and vk are determined by
uk = (1 − αk + βk)/(c + 1)
vk = (1 − αk)/(c + 1)
 
. (12)
iii) Initial upper-bound Xu
k is determined by
Xu
k = 1 − βk/(c + αk). (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
4To take into the possibility of corner solution, the recursion (3) needs to be reformulated as
s
y
k (xk) = max
0≤yk≤1−xk







(1 − xk − yk)yk − cy2
k/2 + ρs
y
k−1 ((1 − xk − yk)/c), if 0 < yk < 1 − xk,
ρs
y
k−1 (min{1,(1 − xk)/c}), if yk = 0,
ρs
y
k−1 (0) − c(1 − xk)2 /2, if yk = 1 − xk,
with 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for i = 1,2,...,k. The analysis of this type of constrained dynamic optimization problem can only be
carried out with the recursive technique (Stokey and Lucas (1995)) and the meaningful conclusions are generally obtained
through numerical simulations.
5The particular expression is selected for s
y
k (xk) by trial and error so as to keep the recursive formula for the coeﬃcients
to their simplest forms and at same retain the economic meaning for each coeﬃcient.
43. THE TURNPIKE PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS
First, we analysis the long-run convergency in recursive relationships for payoff coefﬁcients, economically
meaningful range and the optimal policy parameters and then discuss the nice characteristics of the Turnpike
property.
The following observations can be veriﬁed straightforwardly for c > 1 and any 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
Proposition 1. i) While {αk} is a monotonically increasing sequence with
0 < α1 < α2 < ... < α∞ ≤ 1,
{vk} is a monotonically decreasing sequence with
1 > v1 > v2 > ...v∞ = ¯ v (ρ) > 0.
ii) {βk}, {uk} and {Xu
k} are positive sequences that converges cyclically to their stationary value
β∞, u∞ and Xu
∞, respectively.
iii) When ρ < 1, {γk} converges to a constant γ∞, otherwise, {γk} approaches inﬁnity.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Stationary values of relevant coefﬁcients are listed in Table 1.




c(c(c + 2) + ρ)
c2 (c + 2)
2 − ρ
   
c
2ρ
((c + 2)c − ρ − η)
βk 0
ρc(c + 1)
c2 (c + 2)
2 − ρ
    c
c(c + 2)(c + 1) − (c + 1)(ρ + η)







c2 (c + 2)
2 − ρ
   
ρ
 










c2 (c + 2) − ρ + cρ
c2 (c + 2)
2 − ρ
   
c2 + 3ρ + η




c2 (c + 2) − ρ
c2 (c + 2)
2 − ρ
   
(c + 2)
 




k 1 1 −
ρ
c(c + 1)(c + 2)
   
2(c + 1 + ρ)
c2 + 4c + 2 + ρ − η
Remarks η ˙ =
 
((c + 2)
2 − ρ)(c2 − ρ) and γ∞ (1) = ∞
Table 1: Optimal policy
BasedonProposition1, all recursivecoefﬁcientsconvergetotheir stationaryvaluesinthelong-run. Although
convergence demands that k approaches inﬁnity in theory, in reality a “Turnpike property” does exhibit so that
the convergenceis accomplishedin limited periods (less than 10 in our example). Typical trajectories of (uk,vk)
and Xu
k are provided in Fig. 1, from which the speed of convergency to the stationary values, that is, the speed
to reach the “Turnpike”, can be appreciated6. Therefore, when the planning horizon is sufﬁciently long, facing
any initial state X1 ∈ Xu
∞, the dynamic optimizer will choose its output according to
Yt = Rρ (Xt) ˙ =¯ u(ρ) − ¯ v (ρ)Xt, t ≥ 1, (14)
for almost the entire process, or more precisely, for all but the ﬁnal 10 periods of the process. For the ﬁnal 10
periods, the optimal plan will then change to (7).
6Stated loosely, the turnpike property describes a situation where an economy, which pursues optimality over a suf-
ﬁciently long period, spends most of the periods performing nearly a steady state extremal path. Eventually, over an
inﬁnite horizon, any optimal trajectory should converge towards such an extremal steady state. See Haurie (1976) for the
details.
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uk → ¯ u(ρ)




(a) ρ = 1/2, c = 3/2
k




uk → ¯ u(ρ)




(b) ρ = 1, c = 3/2
FIG. 1 Illustration of the Turnpike property
While the price-taker’s response is ﬁxed to Eq. (1), (14) will be applied repeatedly for long sequence of
periods at the beginning of the process. (Xt,Yt) will then converge to a steady state (¯ x(ρ), ¯ y(ρ)) independent
of the initial state X1 (or, initial price P0), where
¯ x(ρ) ˙ =
c + 1 + ρ
c2 + cρ + 3c + 1 + 2ρ
and ¯ y (ρ) ˙ =
c + ρ
c2 + cρ + 3c + 1 + 2ρ
. (15)
Solongas convergenceto thestationaryoutputs(¯ x(ρ), ¯ y (ρ)) is achieved,it will beproducedmostofperiods
untilapproximatelythe ﬁnal10periods. Inotherwords, exceptforthe veryearlyperiodsandtheverylate periods
ofthe dynamicalinteraction,theoutputbundlewill remainas (¯ x(ρ), ¯ y (ρ)) formost ofplanningperiods. At each
period, an equilibrium proﬁt pair (¯ πx (ρ), ¯ πy (ρ)) is earned by the respectively ﬁrms, where
¯ πx (ρ) ˙ =
1
2
c(c + 1 + ρ)
2
((c + 2)(c + ρ) + c + 1)
2 and ¯ πy (ρ) ˙ =
1
2
c(c + ρ)(c + 2 + ρ)
((c + 2)(c + ρ) + c + 1)
2. (16)
Needless to say, this proﬁt pair (¯ πx (ρ), ¯ πy (ρ)) is equal to the long-run average proﬁts for respective ﬁrm.
What we shall do now is to provide the economic interpretations for these stationary values by linking them
to the relevant equivalences in an one-period myopic optimization problem.
Let theprice-taker’sresponsebe ﬁxedto (1),but assume thatthe dynamicoptimizer’sbest-responseis instead
derived from the following ﬁrst-order static optimization condition:
D + ytD′ +  
dXt
dYt
D′ = C′(Yt), (17)
where   ∈ [0,1] is a variational parameter that reﬂects the dynamic optimizer’s information accuracy and/or
conﬁdence about the counter-response from the price-taker, i.e., dXt/dYt.
The dynamic optimizer realizes that the price-taker’s long run reaction to the market price Pt−1 boils down
to a direct “reaction” to its output Yt in the long-run so that Xt must lie on a “stationary reaction curve” Xt =
Rx
w (Yt) implicitly deﬁned by
Xt = MC−1 (Pt) = MC−1 (D(Xt + Yt)), (18)
should an intertemporal equilibrium is arrived.
6For the Linear Model, it turns out Xt = Rx
w (Yt) = (1 − Yt)/(1 + c) and dXt/dYt = −1/(1 + c). Conse-
quently, the variational best-response reaction for the dynamic optimizer can be derived from (17) as
Yt = r (ρ) (Xt) ˙ =
(c + 1)(1 − Xt)
(c + 1)(c + 2) −  (ρ)
. (19)
Then we immediately verify that Eq. (19), together with (1), will yield an intertemporal equilibrium that is
identical to (¯ x(ρ), ¯ y(ρ)) with
 (ρ) ˙ =(c + 1)ρ/(c + ρ). (20)
Therefore, for any given c, there exists an one-to-one correspondence between the variational parameter  
(which characterizes the informationavailability or accuracy)for the static optimization (one-shot game) and the













it is concurred that the minimum and the maximum of ¯ πy (ρ) occur at ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 respectively.
Case I: ρ = 0, that is when the future payoffs are heavily discounted
It follows from the recursive formula of (9)-(11) that βk = 0 and γk = 0 for all k ≥ 0 while αk = α1 for all
k ≥ 0 so that the stationary optimal plan (14) for ρ = 0 simpliﬁes to
Yt = Rρ=0 (Xt) = (1 − Xt)/(c + 2), t > 1. (21)
We see immediately that Rρ=0 is nothing but the instantaneous Cournot best response r (0) speciﬁed in (19).
In other words, when the futureproﬁt is discountedheavily, multi-periodsdynamicoptimizationdegeneratesinto
inﬁnitely repeated “static optimization”7.
Case II. ρ = 1, that is when the future payoffs are not discounted, which leads to the maximum ¯ πy (1).
The optimal response is given by
Yt = Rρ=1 (Xt) = ¯ u(1) − ¯ v (1)Xt. (22)
Thefollowingpropositionconﬁrmsthat ¯ πy (1)isexactlytheun-discountedaverageproﬁtgivenbylimk→∞ sY
k (xk)/k.
Proposition 2. ¯ πy (1) = limk→∞ sY
k (xk)/k = c/(2(c + 3)(c + 1)).
Proof. See Appendix A.
What is the economic interpretation of long-run average proﬁt ¯ πy (1)? We note from (20) that  (1) = 1 so
that (19) takes the form of
Yt = r (1) (Xt) =
(c + 1)(1 − Xt)
c2 + 3c + 1
, (23)
which is the standard reaction function of Walrasian-Stackelberg game in which the price-taker plays the role of
a follower while the dynamic optimizer plays the role of Stackelberg leader.
The above discussions are summarized in the following theorem.
7The impact of short-run commitments in dynamic oligopolies have been explored by Maskin and Tirole (1987) and
Dana and Montrucchio (1986, 1987), in which Markov strategies (or dynamic reaction functions) in deterministic inﬁnite-
horizon duopoly games with alternating moves have been derived for quadratic payoﬀs in particular. One of their main
results is that the set of Markov-perfect equilibria converges to the one-shot best reply functions as the players get more
and more impatient (i.e. the discount factor tends to zero), which is consistent to our analysis.
7¯ y(ρ)
¯ x(ρ)















FIG. 2 Static equilibria vs. Stationary equilibria
Theorem 2 (Equivalency). When the planing horizon T is suﬃciently long, the optimal plan for
the multiperiod dynamic optimization becomes stationary. This results in a stationary equilibrium that
coincides exactly with the intertemporal equilibrium resulted from the variational best-response (19) in
an one-period static optimization problem. The stationary proﬁts are then the long run average proﬁts
for the respective ﬁrm.
In particular, when the dynamic optimizer is shortsighted (i.e., ρ = 0), the stationary optimal plan
is to execute the Cournot reaction for all periods. The dynamic optimizer achieves a minimum possible
long-run average proﬁt that coincides with the one achieved with the Walrasian-Cournot equilibrium.
When the dynamic optimizer is provident (i.e., ρ = 1), the dynamic optimizer achieves a maximum
possible long-run average proﬁt that coincides with the one achieved with the Walrasian-Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Remark 1. It is worthwhile to emphasize that, although an one-to-one correspondence can be es-
tablished between the intertemporal equilibrium of the static optimization problem and the long run
stationary outcome of the dynamic optimization, there exists fundamental diﬀerence in general in in-
terpreting these outcomes. In terms of best-response reaction, unless ρ = 0, we have
Rρ  = r (ρ)










These distinctions are illustrated in Fig. 2, in which the thick portion drawn along the price-taker’s
long-run reaction curve Rx
w represents the stationary equilibrium (¯ x(ρ), ¯ y (ρ)), while (¯ x(0), ¯ y (0)) and
(¯ x(1), ¯ y(1)) coincide the Walrasian-Stackelberg equilibrium Es and Walrasian-Cournot equilibrium Ec,
respectively. The improvement of stationary proﬁt gained by the dynamic optimizer from ρ = 0 to ρ = 1
is evidenced by inward-shifting of iso-proﬁt curve πy (ρ). πy (1) is the maximum proﬁt that the dynamic
optimizer can obtain since it is tangent to the price-taker’s implicit reaction Rx
w. Also can be seen is
the diﬀerence between the static reaction Rρ=1 and the stationary reaction r (1) (but Rρ=0 coincides
with r (0)).
4. RELATIVE PROFITABILITY OF PRICE-TAKING STRATEGY
As having been explored in the last section, for all the initial state X1 < Xu
∞, a stationary equilibrium
proﬁt bundle (¯ πx (ρ), ¯ πy (ρ)) always results if the planning horizon T is sufﬁciently long, at which the long-run
average of the proﬁt difference between the dynamic optimizer and the price-taker is given by
∆yx (c,ρ) ˙ =¯ πy (ρ) − ¯ πx (ρ) =
−c
2((c + 2)(c + ρ) + c + 1)
2 < 0. (24)
That is to say, for all possible initial price P0 ∈ (0, ¯ p∞), the long-run average proﬁts made by the dynamic
optimizer is always less than the one made by the price-taker. This fact is consistent with the conclusion for the
intertemporal equilibrium discussed in Huang (2002).
How about the average relative proﬁtability when the planning horizon T is relatively short? To answer
this question, we can analyze the accumulated proﬁt difference s
yx
k (xk) = s
y
k (xk) − sx





T−j+1 (xj), for i ∈ {x,y}. Apparently, s
yx
k must be a quadratic function of xk as well
and it satisﬁes the recursive relation:
s
yx
k (xk) = ∆
yx





0 ( ) = 0, where ∆
yx
k is the relative proﬁt of the two ﬁrms at the stage k given by
∆
xy
k (xk) ˙ =π
y
k (xk) − πx




We are able to arrive at the following recursive relationships for the parameters of s
yx
k as follows:
Proposition 3. The accumalted proﬁt diﬀerence s
yx
k can be expressed as
s
yx









k = (bk ±
 
b2
k + akdk)/ak and the following recursive relations hold for k ≥ 1:






/2 + ρ(1 − vk)
2 ak−1/c
2, (27)
bk = ρ(1 − vk)(1 − uk)ak−1/c2 + (vk + 1)/2 − ρ(1 − vk)bk−1/c − ukvk (2 + c)/2, (28)
dk = 2ρ(1 − uk)/cbk−1 + ρdk−1 − ρ(1 − uk)
2 ak−1/c
2 − uk (1 − (2 + c)uk/2), (29)
with the boundary conditions
a0 = b0 = d0 = 0.
9Proof. Omitted since it can be veriﬁed straightforwardly.
Remark 2. Although it is tedious, it can veriﬁed straightforwardly that limk→∞ dk/k = ∆yx (ρ).
Deﬁnexl










0 if and only if xk ∈ Ωx
k. We shall call Ωx
k the relative proﬁtability range for the price-taker. The compact prop-
erty of Ωx
k suggests that if xa,xb ∈ Ωx
k, then for all xǫ = ǫxb + (1 − ǫ)xa,with ǫ ∈ (0,1), we have xǫ ∈ Ωx
k.
Due to the cyclically converging characteristics of policy parameter uk, the recursive relations (27) to (29)
suggest that both qu
k and ql
k must be cyclically converging sequences as well. Therefore, when k is small, there
does not exist monotonically inclusive relationships among Ωx
k. On the other hand, the Turnpike property of the
optimal policy ensures that Ωx
k do exhibit “expansion property” for k > 10, as depicted in Fig. 3. Formally, we
have
Theorem 3. For Linear Model with c > 1 and arbitrary 0 < ρ ≤ 1, we have
i) there always exists a compact set Ωx
k ⊂ [0,Xu
k] such that the price-taker can make higher average
proﬁt than the dynamic optimizer if xk ∈ Ωx
k;
ii) there exists a k∗ > 1 such that Ωx
k ⊂ Ωx




Proof. See Appendix A.
Substituting yk = uk − vkxk into (4), we are able to get the inverse recursive relation for the price-taker’s
output:
xk−1 = θ(xk) = (1 − uk)/c − σkxk (30)
where σk ˙ =(1 − vk)/c.
For k >> 10, we have
xk−1 = (1 − ¯ u(ρ))/c − σ (ρ)xk, (31)
with σ(c,ρ) = (1 − ¯ v (ρ))/c. The convergencyspeed of Xt to the intertemporalequilibrium ¯ x(ρ) given in (15)
is determined by the multiplier of σ(c,ρ), which in turns accounts for the rate of expansion of Ωx
k for large k.
The larger the value of σ(c,ρ) is, the faster the convergencyspeed of Xt to ¯ x(ρ) and the faster that Ωx
k expands
with increasing k.
Simple algebra manipulation reveals that
a) ∂σ(c,ρ)/∂ρ > 0, i.e., for ﬁxing c, increasing the discount factor ρ decreases the stability of (31) and
hence decreases the expansion rate of Ωx
k along increasing k; and
b) ∂σ(c,ρ)/∂c < 0, i.e., for ﬁxingρ, increasingthe cost c parameterincreases the stability of (31)and hence
increases the expansion rate of Ωx
k along increasing k.
Let λ denote the Lebesgue measure, then λ(Ωx
k) indicates the width of Ωx
k. We have the following observa-
tions:
i) Ωx
1 = (1/(c + 3),1/(c + 1)) is independent of ρ while Ωx
∞ = (0,Xu
∞) depends on both c and ρ.
However, we have ∂λ(Ωx
1)/∂c < 0 but ∂λ(Ωx
∞)/∂c > 0. While higher production cost c reduces the
one-shot relative proﬁtable range for the price-taker, it does beneﬁt the price-taker in the long-run. On
the other hand, higher production cost c slows down the expansion speed of Ωk. This is consistent with
the fact that higher production cost c stabilizes the system (from ∂σ(c,ρ)/∂c < 0). These facts can be
conﬁrmed by comparing Fig. 3(a) with Fig. 3(c).
ii) ∂λ(Ωx
∞)/∂ρ < 0, that is, lower discount factor increases the long-run relative proﬁtable range for the
price-taker. Since lower discount factor increases the stability of the dynamic process as well, it speeds up
the expansion rate of Ωk. These facts can be conﬁrmed by comparing Fig. 3(a) with Fig. 3(b).
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(a) ρ = 1/2, c = 3/2
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(b) ρ = 1, c = 3/2
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(c) ρ = 1/2, c = 1
FIG. 3 Relative proﬁtability range for the price-taker
11iii) The average proﬁt difference in the long-run is given by limk→∞ s
yx
k = ∆yx (c,ρ), where ∆yx (c,ρ) is
deﬁned in (24). It can be veriﬁed that ∂∆yx (c,ρ)/∂ρ > 0 and ∂∆yx (c,ρ)/∂c > 0. Therefore, the more
advanced the technology (the smaller c) is, and/or the more the future proﬁt is discounted, the larger the
long-run proﬁt difference is.
5. FINAL REMARKS
We have proved theoretically and demonstrated numerically with a Linear Model that relative proﬁtability
of price-taking strategy can still be preserved even when a rival ﬁrm strives to maximize its discounted proﬁt
over ﬁnite or inﬁnite planning horizon. In particular, when the marginal cost is not too small (c > 1), an interior
optimal plan can always be implementedso that for anyﬁnite planninghorizon,when the initial price falls within
the a compact relative proﬁtability range that centered around the Walrasian equilibrium price, the price-taker
always ends up with a higher relative proﬁt as compared to the dynamic optimizer in terms of average proﬁt.
This relative proﬁtability range expands with increasing planning horizon and ﬁnally covers almost all of the
price-domain when the planning horizon approaches inﬁnity.
It is, however, worthwhile to mention that
a) although our analysis is carried out to a duopoly, the analysis can be carried out to the general oligopoly
model consisting of n price-takers and m dynamic optimizers who form a monopolistic cartel and produce at
an identical output level.8 Analogous conclusions can be arrived for such generalization except that the stability
condition, the economically meaningful range and the relative proﬁtability range vary with the distribution pa-
rameters n and m. However, the implication is straightforward: even the higher relative proﬁtability enjoyed by
the price-taker may induce additional price-takers to enter the market so that long run proﬁt difference with re-
spect to the dynamic optimizer will be reduced, but the relative proﬁtability advantage always prevails, no matter
how insigniﬁcant it is, unless free entry is allowed9.
b) the adoption of Linear Model enables us to present all results in analytical closed forms so that the exact
optimal plan as well as related concepts can be derived recursively and evaluated rigorously. Our numerical
simulations do conﬁrmthat the same conclusionscan be arrivedwhen general nonlineardemandand/ormarginal
cost are adopted.
It should be warned that the higherrelative proﬁt is not intentionallybut unconsciouslyachievedby the price-
taker. It is a free-rider and the outcome arises simply because its rival is concerned with its own absolute proﬁt,
i.e., the dynamicoptimize’s objective is to maximize discountedABSOLUTE proﬁt instead of RELATIVE proﬁt
as compared to the price-taker over the planning horizon. Even so, it is by no mean suggested that the dynamic
optimizing is an inferior strategy. The truth is, with the cost-saving technology (c < 1) and limited planning
horizon, the dynamic optimizer can effectively fulﬁll dual goals of achieving the absolute proﬁtability (due to
optimizing behavior) and at the same time maintaining the relative proﬁtability under many circumstances (due
to xk / ∈ Ωy
x).
Needless to say, this research can be extended and generalized in many different ways.
First, as we have seen in the this part of research, the adoptionof Linear Model inevitablybrings unnecessary
difﬁculty of market crash and force us to concentrateour attention to the interior optimal solution. Economically,
corner solution (occurring for c < 1 and/or xk ∈ [0,1]\Xk) may of interest in its own sake because it may be
rational for the dynamic optimizer to stop production for one or two period(s) to allow the price level raise to
a desired high level. It is similarly rational for the dynamic optimizer to intentionally over-supply to push the
8It is impossible to study the dynamic optimization problem when each dynamic optimizer acts individually unless a
proper sequence of choice is assumed, as assumed in Cyert and DeGroot (1970).
9If so, the strategic advantage of price-takers should vanish in limit because the long run proﬁts of price-takers become
indistinguishable from dynamic proﬁt maximizers as the oligopolistic competition converges to the perfect competition.
12market price extremely low so that the price-taker are enticed to produce an extremely small quantity at the next
period or even be forced to exit the market. Such consideration motivates us to explore the optimal plan that is
not economically meaningful.
Secondly, instead of devising an optimal plan for long periods, the optimizer may also consider to break
the planning horizon, say T, into a number of short periods, say L, and repeat the optimal plan cyclically for
T/L times. Such sub-optimal planning may be taken as a measure to prevent the optimal plan from becoming
stationary and thus avoid the “free-rider” beneﬁt enjoyed by the price-taker. Apparently, a prerequisite for such
implementation is an additional boundary constraint: X1 = XL+1. How the sub-optimal plan changes the
relative proﬁtability of the price-taker will be explored.
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7. APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1:
i) and ii): Substituting (8) and (6) into (5) and rearranging yields
s
y




H (yk) = h1y2














(b) c = 1, ρ = 1/2
FIG. 4 Illustration of recursive map αk = Hα (αk−1)
with
h1 ˙ = −
 















αk−1 (c − 1 + xk)
2 + c2γk−1 + 2cβk−1 (1 − xk)
 
If the second-order condition d2s
y
k (xk)/(dyk)
2 = h1 < 0 is satisﬁed, that is,
αk−1 < α∗ ˙ =c2 (2 + c)/ρ, (34)








c2 (c + 2) − ραk−1
xk +
ραk−1 (c − 1) − ρcβk−1 + c2









c2 (2 + c) − 2ραk−1
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k +
ρc(αk−1c − (c + 1)βk−1) − c2







ρβk−1 + 2c + 2c2 
− ραk−1
 
−c3 + c + 2ρβk−1
 





Comparing the above expression with (8) leads to (9)-(11). Recasting (35) leads to (12).
The initial values follow from the boundary condition of s
y
0 (x0) = 0.
iii) With yk = uk − vkxk, we have
pk = 1 − uk − (1 − vk)xk.
pk > 0 thus requires that xk < (1 − uk)/(1 − vk) = 1 − βk/(c + αk). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
i) The recursive relation (9), rewritten as
αk = Hα (αk−1) ˙ =
c(c + ραk−1)
c2 (2 + c) − ραk−1
14is essentially an one-dimensional discrete dynamic process with the derivative properties: ∂Hα/∂αk−1 > 0
and ∂2Hα/∂α2
k−1 > 0. Hence, Hα is a monotonically increasing convex map. Starting with α0 = 0, α1 =
Hα (0) > 0, we obtain a monotonically increasing sequence. As illustrated in Fig.4, when c > 1, the map Hα











(c2 − ρ)((c + 2)












(c2 − ρ)((c + 2)
2 − ρ), (37)
where α∗ is deﬁned in (34) and 0 < α∞ ≤ α′
∞ < α∗. More importantly, it can be veriﬁed that α1 = Hα (0) <
α′
∞.
By the analytical nature of Hα, we must have 0 <
∂Hα
∂αk−1




∞ > 1. Since α1 <
α and Hα intersects the 45 degree line in the αk-αk−1 plane from above, the sequence {αk} will converge
monotonically to the lower ﬁxed point α∞. Moreover, from the expression of (36) itself, we can see that α∞ <
α∗, which implies that α1 < α2 < ... < α∞ < α∗.
While αk converges monotonically to α∞, Eq. (10) degenerates into a constant coefﬁcient linear dynamic
process:
βk = Hβ (βk−1) =
ρc(c + 1)(α∞ − βk−1)
c2 (2 + c) − ρα∞
which will converges cyclically to its stationary value β∞ if the absolute value of the slope
 
 









c2 (c + 2) − ρα∞
is less than unity, which can be shown to be true when c ≥ 1.
iii) The rest of conclusions follow directly from their relationships with αk and βk. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
ForT is sufﬁcientlylarge,and(22)is implementedforsufﬁcientlylongtime, s
y
T (X1) = sY
T (xT) approaches
inﬁnity, which is conﬁrmed by the facts that limk→∞ αk = α∞ and limk→∞ βk = β∞ for all ρ ≤ 1 but
limk→∞ γk = γ∞ exists only for ρ < 1. When ρ = 1, γk does not converge because the recursive relation (11)
simpliﬁes to
γk = γk−1 +




αk−1 + 2c(c + 1)βk−1
c2 (c + 2) − αk−1
. (38)
If we evaluate the average payoff sY











, ρ = 1.
When k → ∞, it follows from (38) that
lim
k→∞
γk/(2k) ≃  πy  +
γk−1
2k
when k → ∞,
where
 πy  =




α∞ + 2c(c + 1)β∞
2(c2 (c + 2) − α∞)
,
10“Average” here is deﬁned in the conventional sense so that the proﬁt at each period carries an equal weight for the
purpose of possible evaluation of long-run characteristics.
15which then suggests that limk→∞ sY
k (xk)/k = limk→∞ γk/(2k) =  πy . Substituting α∞ and β∞ with their
respective values given by (9) and (10) into above expression leads to  πy  = c/(2(c + 3)(c + 1)), which is
exactly ¯ πy (1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
ii).and iii)
Based on the Turnpike property, when k >> 10, the optimal response converges to
yk = ¯ u(ρ) − ¯ v (ρ)xk (39)
and ∆
yx
k (xk) < 0 if and only if xk ∈ Λ∞ ˙ =(xl,xu), where
xl =
¯ u(ρ)
¯ v (ρ) + 1
and xu =
2 − (c + 2) ¯ u(ρ)
(c + 2)(1 − ¯ v (ρ))
.
Applying the inverse recursive relation (31), we get
θ(xl) =
1 − 2¯ u(ρ) + ¯ v (ρ)





It can be veriﬁed that θ(xu) > xl and θ(xl) ≤ xu, or equivalently, θ(Λ∞) ⊂ Λ∞. Therefore, if there exists
a large enough k∗ such that Λ∞ ⊆ Ωx
k∗, then for all k > k∗, starting with xk ∈ Λ∞, the implementation of the
optimal plan given by (39) does not only lead to ∆
yx
k (xk) < 0 but also enforces xk−1 to fall into Λ∞.11
Following from the continuity of the accumulated proﬁt differencefunction s
yx
k and the inversely converging
propertyof{xk}, thereexistssuchaǫk < xl thatsolongasxk ∈ (xl − ǫ,xl)∪(xu,xu + ǫ),wehave∆
yx
k (xk) >




k (xk) = ∆
yx
k (xk)





      
(−) due to xk−1∈Λ∞⊂Ωx
k−1
< 0, (40)
that is, the possibility in which the negative accumulated proﬁt difference in later periods outweighs the positive
instantaneous proﬁt difference, which justiﬁes the expectations that there exists a k∗ around 10 and Ωx
k expands
with increasing k for all k > k∗. In other words, we have Ωx
k∗ ⊂ Ωx





∞] follows from the fact that ∆yx (c,ρ) < 0 for all X1 ∈ [0,Xu
∞]. Q.E.D.
11In this sense, Λ∞ is essentially a “super relative proﬁtability range” for the price-taker in the sense that so long as the
price-taker’s current output happens to fall within it, the price-taker does not only make higher proﬁt than the dynamic
optimizer instantaneously at the current period but also makes a higher average proﬁt than the dynamic optimizer for all
the future periods.
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